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Abstract
We examine if an expansion in the supply of public preschool crowds-out private
enrollment using rich data for municipalities in Brazil from 2000-2006, where federal
transfers to local governments change discontinuously with given population thresh-
olds. Results from a regression-discontinuity design reveal that larger federal transfers
lead to a significant expansion of local public preschool services, but show no effects
on the quantity or quality of private provision. These findings are consistent with a
theory in which households differ in willingness-to-pay for preschool services, and
private suppliers optimally adjust prices in response to an expansion of lower-quality,
free-of-charge public supply.
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1 Introduction
Public policies aimed at increasing access to formal preschool education are high on the political
agenda in a number of countries. There are probably two main reasons for this. First, a higher
supply of formal preschool education is seen as a crucial tool for achieving higher (female) partic-
ipation rates in the labor market. Second, there is a growing body of evidence indicating that there
might be important long-term individual benefits to enrollment in preschool education. Among
several recent studies, Berlinski, Galiani and Manacorda (2008) and Berlinski, Galiani and Gertler
(2009), using data from Uruguay and Argentina, respectively, present causal evidence of a positive
effect of preschool attendance on primary school outcomes. Such effects might persist also in the
longer run, as suggested by Havnes and Mogstad (2011a), who find strong positive effects of a
large-scale expansion of subsidized child care in Norway on children’s educational attainment and
labor force participation.1
Access to formal child care is a particularly important policy issue in developing countries,
where enrollment rates are generally much lower, and where private institutions constitute a much
larger share of the formal preschool sector, than in developed countries.2 The generally low and
uneven access to preschool education is arguably reflected in the observation of large disparities in
cognitive development at the start of primary school in many developing countries. For example,
Paxson and Schady (2007) document a widening gap in cognitive development between poor and
non-poor children under the age of 6 in Ecuador.3 After this age, the gap remains constant. Why
do these gaps emerge and why do they stop growing? In light of the previously cited studies,
a possible explanation lies in the differences in opportunities available−in particular, access to
1Positive effects of preschool education might even increase over time if human capital in-
vestments are characterized by dynamic complementarities, as argued by Carneiro and Heckman
(2004).
2See UNESCO (2008) for statistics and further information about formal preschool in devel-
oped and developing countries. Bastos and Cristia (2012) examine supply and quality choices of
private suppliers in the city of Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil.
3Paxson and Schady (2010) show that conditional cash transfers are unlikely to contribute to-
wards narrowing this gap.
2
formal child care−to poor and non-poor children in their early years.
In order to remedy such problems, an available policy option is to increase the public sup-
ply of (free or widely affordable) preschool education. The intended effects of such a policy
are two-fold: (i) to provide more equitable access and (ii) to increase the total supply of formal
child care. However, the successfulness of such a policy depends crucially on the extent to which
increased public supply crowds out existing private supply, which in turn depends on how pri-
vate preschool providers respond strategically to increased competition from public providers. Do
private providers respond by lowering their prices and competing more aggressively in all mar-
ket segments? Or do they react by increasingly targeting higher-income households that do not
find public providers attractive? If an expansion in free-of-charge public supply simply induces
households to switch from high-quality private suppliers to lower-quality public centers, negative
impacts on child development cannot be excluded.
In the present paper we analyze these questions empirically by examining the effect of changes
in the supply of public child care services on the private child care provision in Brazil. We use
rich municipal-level panel data covering the period 2000-2006 to analyze the effect of increased
availability of public child care centers on the quantity of private supply, as measured by private
enrollment rates and number of private centers. We also check whether increased public supply
has any impact on the quality of private child care, as measured by group size, teacher qualification
and quality of infrastructure. To plausibly identify exogenous variation in public supply, we exploit
unique features of the allocation mechanism of federal transfers to municipalities in Brazil, where
the transfers received by local governments exhibit a non-linear and non-monotonic relationship
with given population estimates. Results from a regression-discontinuity design reveal that larger
federal transfers to a given municipality lead to a significant expansion of public preschool services
(as measured by the number of municipal centers and enrollment), but show no effects on the
quality or quantity of private preschool provision.
To guide the interpretation of our empirical results, we develop a simple theoretical model of
vertical differentiation, analyzing the optimal pricing response of a private child care provider to
3
entry of a public competitor. In the model, public preschool education is free of charge (zero
price), whereas private providers optimally set prices in a profit-maximizing way and supply
higher-quality services. Demand for preschool services comes from two different segments of
households, one with higher willingness-to-pay for preschool education and more homogeneous
preferences than the other. The private provider optimally chooses between a high-price strategy,
serving consumers with high willingness-to-pay only, and a low-price strategy, serving consumers
from both segments. An expansion of public supply has ambiguous effects on private enrollment,
depending on the difference in willingness-to-pay across consumer segments and on the relative
size of each segment. Crowding-out effects of more public provision are less likely when the
differences in willingness-to-pay across consumer segments are relatively large.
Our paper clearly relates to the more general literature on crowd-out effects of government
funding, in particular the strand of the literature dealing with crowd-out effects of public provision
of private goods. However, the existing empirical research has mainly been devoted to health care
markets. Cutler and Gruber (1996) and Gruber and Simon (2008) analyze the extent to which
public health insurance crowd out private insurance, while Cohen, Freeborn and McManus (2013)
study crowd-out effects of public providers in the US market for outpatient substance abuse treat-
ment. In each case, sizeable crowd-out effects are identified. The only empirical study on child
care markets that we are aware of in this particular strand of the literature is Bassok, Fitzpatrick
and Loeb (2012), who find no evidence of any substantial crowd-out of private providers as a result
of increased public provision in the child care markets in Oklahoma and Georgia. In this respect,
the results from their study are reminiscent of ours.4
While there is very little empirical literature on the response of private providers to increased
public supply of child care, there exists a considerable literature on the effect of public (or subsi-
dized) child care provision on maternal labor supply, which is a related but still distinctly different
issue. Although the reported results from this strand of the literature are quite heterogeneous,
4There is also a related recent study by Owens and Rennhoff (2012), who examine competi-
tion between for-profit and nonprofit child care providers in four Tennessee counties and find no
evidence that nonprofit providers crowd out for-profit ones.
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most recent studies (applying quasi-experimental approaches) find that increased public financing
of child care tends to crowd out existing child care provision, quantitatively ranging from mod-
erate crowd-out effects (e.g., Baker, Gruber and Milligan, 2008) to almost complete crowd-out
with practically no effect on maternal labor supply (e.g., Cascio, 2009, and Havnes and Mogstad,
2011b). However, this literature is generally not able to distinguish whether public child care
provision crowds out private provision of formal or informal child care. While this distinction is
irrelevant for the question of maternal labor supply, it is of course crucial if the policy aim is to
increase the total supply of formal child care in order to reap the long-term benefits of increased
preschool attendance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a simple theo-
retical model of a market for formal preschool education. We use the model to analyze optimal
pricing responses of a private preschool provider to entry of a public competitor and identify the
circumstances under which public provision is likely (or not) to crowd out private provision. In
Section 3 we give some information about the institutional characteristics that are important for
the implementation of our empirical analysis. A detailed description of the data is presented in
Section 4, while the empirical method and results are presented and discussed in Sections 5 and 6,
respectively. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
2 Theoretical model
Consider a market for institutional preschool education with potentially two providers: one private
and one public. The private provider offers preschool services at quality q and price p. For sim-
plicity, we take a short-term perspective by assuming that the quality level is fixed, making price
the only choice variable of the private provider. The public provider offers preschool education for
free (zero price). However, we assume that the quality of preschool is lower in the public provider.
By normalizing the quality level in the public provider to zero, we can interpret p and q as the price
and quality differences, respectively, between private and public preschool.
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Demand for preschool services comes from two different segments, henceforth referred to as
Segment A and Segment B. Both segments are characterized by unit demand, where each consumer
demands either one unit of child care from the most preferred provider, or zero units if that is
the utility-maximizing choice. Consumers in Segment A have homogeneous preferences and are
characterized by relatively high willingness-to-pay for preschool education. For a consumer in this
segment, the net utility of buying one unit of preschool education is given by
uA =
 vA+q− p if buying from the private providervA if buying from the public provider . (1)
Consumers in Segment B, on the other hand, are characterized by a lower willingness-to-pay for
preschool services and we also assume that these consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the
marginal valuation of quality. For a consumer in this segment, the net utility of buying one unit of
preschool is given by
uB =
 vB+θq− p if buying from the private providervB if buying from the public provider , (2)
where vB < vA and θ is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. Although not explicitly mod-
elled, a reasonable interpretation of the two demand segments would be that Segment A and Seg-
ment B consist of high-income and low-income consumers, respectively. We assume that there are
n consumers in Segment A, while the total consumer mass in Segment B is normalized to 1.
In order to analyze the effect of public preschool supply on private enrollment, we will compare
the equilibria under two different scenarios: (i) a private monopoly and (ii) a mixed duopoly with
a private and a public provider. Public price and quality are exogenously given while we let the
private provider optimally choose its price in order to maximize profits, which is given by
pi= (p− cq)D, (3)
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where c ∈ (0,1) is a cost parameter and D := DA +DB is total demand for the private provider,
which is the sum of demand from Segment A (DA) and Segment B (DB). Notice that, since con-
sumers in Segment A are perfectly homogeneous, demand from Segment A is either n or 0 (i.e.,
DA = {0,n}), while demand from Segment B is a continuous function of the price charged by the
private provider. Notice also that the cost of meeting higher demand increases with the quality of
preschool services offered.5,6 Finally, we assume that it is not possible for the private provider to
price discriminate among different types of consumers.
2.1 Private monopoly
The profit-maximization problem of the private provider involves choosing between a high-price
strategy which induces demand only from Segment A, and a low-price strategy which induces
demand from both segments.
The optimal high-price strategy is to set the highest possible price that still makes consumers
in Segment A willing to buy preschool services from the private provider. This price is given by
phighM = vA+q. (4)
At this price, no consumer in Segment B is willing to buy preschool services from the private
provider. The corresponding demand and profits are
DhighM = n (5)
and
pihighM = (vA+q(1− c))n. (6)
If the provider chooses a low-price strategy, demand from Segment B is given by DB = 1− θ̂M,
5The restriction c < 1 is made to ensure equilibrium existence in the mixed duopoly case.
6In reality there might also be fixed quality costs. However, as long as quality is exogenously
given such costs are irrelevant for optimal pricing decisions and are therefore dropped.
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where θ̂M = p−vBq is the marginal utility of quality for the consumer in Segment B who is indifferent
between buying preschool services or not from the private provider. Notice that consumers in
Segment A are always willing to buy preschool from the private provider for any price that makes
as least one consumer in Segment B willing to buy (i.e., any price which yields θ̂M ∈ (0,1)). Thus,
the optimal price under a low price strategy is given by
plowM = argmax
{
pi= (p− cq)
(
n+1−
(
p− vB
q
))}
=
q(1+ c+n)+ vB
2
. (7)
The corresponding demand and profits are
DlowM =
q(1+n− c)+ vB
2q
(8)
and
pilowM =
(q(1+n− c)+ vB)2
4q
. (9)
Comparing (6) and (9) yields
pihighM −pilowM =
2nq(2vA− vB)−q2 (1− c−n)2−2qvB (1− c)− v2B
4q
. (10)
From (10) it is easy to verify that the profit difference is monotonically increasing in vA, and that
pihighM −pilowM < 0 if vA→ vB. The following result follows straightforwardly:
Proposition 1 A private monopoly provider will optimally choose a high-price strategy, serving
consumers from Segment A only, if the difference in willingness-to-pay between the two demand
segments is sufficiently high. Otherwise, the provider will choose a low-price strategy and serve
consumers from both segments.
This result is quite intuitive. If the willingness-to-pay for preschool is sufficiently higher in
Segment A than in Segment B, profits are maximized by setting a price so high that all consumer
surplus is extracted from Segment A, at the cost of having no demand from Segment B. Otherwise,
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if the difference in willingness-to-pay is sufficiently small between the two demand segments, it is
more profitable to adopt a low-price strategy and have demand from both segments. Formally, a
high-price strategy is the equilibrium outcome for the parameter space defined by
vA > v̂A :=
v2B+q
2 (1− c−n)2+2qvB (n+1− c)
4nq
. (11)
2.2 Mixed duopoly
In a mixed duopoly, the private provider still has a choice between a high-price and a low-price
strategy, but under each strategy the optimal price differs from the corresponding optimal monopoly
price. With a public provider in the market offering preschool at zero price, it is no longer fea-
sible for the private provider to follow the same high-price strategy as under monopoly. If the
private provider charges a price p = vA + q, all consumers in Segment A would be strictly better
off switching to the public provider (which would give these consumers a positive net utility of vA)
and this would leave the private provider with no demand.
In the presence of a public competitor, the optimal high-price strategy for the private provider
would now be to set the price equal to the quality difference between private and public preschool:
phighD = q. (12)
This would make all consumers in Segment A (weakly) prefer the private provider while the con-
sumers in Segment B would choose the public provider.7 Thus, the corresponding demand and
profits for the private center are
DhighD = n (13)
and
pihighD = (1− c)qn. (14)
7Notice that, when public child care is offered at zero price, all consumers (in both demand
segments) will buy child care from one of the providers.
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If the private provider chooses a low-price strategy, the consumer in Segment B who is indiffer-
ent between private and public child care is characterized by θ̂D = pq . At this price, all consumers
from Segment A prefer the private provider, so total demand for this provider is n+ 1− θ̂D. The
profit-maximizing price under a low-price strategy is therefore
plowD = argmax
{
pi= (p− cq)
(
n+1− p
q
)}
=
q(c+n+1)
2
. (15)
At the optimal price, the indifferent consumer in Segment B is characterized by θ̂
(
plowD
)
= 12 (c+n+1).
Thus, an interior solution (i.e., θ̂D ∈ (0,1)) requires that n < 1− c. Otherwise, if n > 1− c, profits
are maximized by choosing the high-price strategy phighD = q, targeting consumers in Segment A
only. Intuitively, a low-price strategy that targets consumers in both segments is optimal only if
the segment with lower willingness-to-pay (Segment B) is sufficiently large relative to the other
demand segment. The condition n < 1− c reveals that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition
for a low-price strategy to be optimal is that Segment B is strictly larger than Segment A.
If the private center chooses the low-price strategy given by (15), demand and profits are given
by
DlowD =
1
2
(1+n− c) (16)
and
pilowD =
q(1+n− c)2
4
. (17)
We have already confirmed that a high-price strategy is always optimal if n > 1− c. It remains to
check whether a low-price strategy is always optimal for n < 1−c. A comparison of (14) and (17)
reveals that this is indeed the case, as
pilowD −pihighD =
q(c+n−1)2
4
> 0. (18)
Thus, the mixed duopoly equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 2 In a mixed duopoly, the private provider will choose a high-price strategy, serving
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consumers from Segment A only, if n > 1− c. Otherwise, if n < 1− c, the private provider will
choose a low-price strategy and serve consumers from both demand segments.
2.3 Does public supply crowd out private enrollment?
Propositions 1 and 2, when seen in conjunction, reveal that we must distinguish between 4 different
regimes when comparing private demand under monopoly and mixed duopoly.
Regime (i): n < 1− c and vA < v̂A.
In this regime, there is a relatively small difference in willingness-to-pay between the two
demand segments, and Segment A is also relatively small compared with Segment B. The private
provider will therefore choose a low-price strategy, targeting consumers in both demand segments,
regardless of whether it faces a public competitor or not. The presence of a public provider will
reduce the price of private preschool and also lead to lower demand for the private provider.8 Thus,
in this regime public preschool supply crowds out private enrollment.
Regime (ii): n > 1− c and vA < v̂A.
In this regime, the difference in willingness-to-pay is still small but the size of Segment A is
relatively large. The private provider will now respond to public competition by switching from a
low-price strategy to a high-price strategy. Sticking to a low-price strategy also in the presence of
a public provider would push the optimal price down and lead to lower profits. If Segment A is
sufficiently large (n> 1−c), it is more profitable for the private provider to meet public competition
by adopting a high-price strategy and only target consumers with relatively high willingness-to-
pay. As in Regime (i), public child care supply crowds out private enrollment.
Regime (iii): n > 1− c and vA > v̂A.
8From (7)-(8) and (15)-(16), it is easily confirmed that plowM > p
low
D and D
low
M > D
low
D .
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If the number of consumers with high willingness-to-pay is relatively large, and if the difference
in willingness-to-pay between the demand segments is also relatively large, the private provider
will always adopt a high-price strategy, targeting consumers from Segment A only. The presence
of a public provider will force the price of private preschool downwards, but demand for the private
provider will remain constant, consisting of all consumers from Segment A. In this case, public
preschool supply has no effect on private enrollment.
Regime (iv): n < 1− c and vA > v̂A.
The final regime to consider is the case where the difference in willingness-to-pay is relatively
large, but consumers with high willingness-to-pay are relatively few. Because of the large dif-
ference in willingness-to-pay, the optimal pricing strategy for the private provider is a high-price
strategy in the absence of public competition. However, since the presence of a public provider
pushes the price of private child care downwards, sticking to a high-price strategy is optimal only
if the size of Segment A is sufficiently large. Otherwise, if n < 1− c, the private provider will op-
timally respond to public preschool supply by switching from a high-price strategy to a low-price
strategy. This regime produces perhaps the most counterintuitive result, where public preschool
supply crowds in private enrollment. The presence of a public provider forces the private provider
to compete for consumers (in Segment B) who would otherwise not be profitable for the private
provider to target. As a result, the demand for private child care increases.
[Table 1 about here]
The main results are summarized in Table 1 and in the final proposition of this theoretical
section:
Proposition 3 (i) If n < 1− c and vA < v̂A, public supply implies that the private provider main-
tains a low-price strategy and private enrollment decreases;
(ii) If n > 1− c and vA < v̂A, public supply implies that the private provider switches from a
low-price strategy to a high-price strategy and private enrollment decreases;
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(iii) If n > 1− c and vA > v̂A, public supply implies that the private provider maintains a high-
price strategy and private enrollment is unaffected;
(iv) If n < 1− c and vA > v̂A, public supply implies that the private provider switches from a
high-price strategy to a low-price strategy and private enrollment increases.
3 Institutional background
This section describes the institutional setting underlying the empirical analysis. We first outline
the rules determining the allocation of federal transfers across Brazilian municipalities, and move
on to describing the system governing the provision of formal preschool services.
3.1 Federal transfers to municipal governments
Brazil has a highly decentralized system of government. Local governments receive large sums of
public funds in the form of intergovernmental transfers, and are responsible for an important share
of public goods provision, notably in the domain of education and culture, health and sanitation,
social assistance and local infrastructure.
A single federal fund−Fundo de Participac¸a˜o dos Municı´pios (FPM)−accounts for about 75%
of all federal transfers and 40% of total municipal revenue. Established by the federal constitution,
this fund consists of automatic federal transfers to municipal governments. At least 15% of total
FPM transfers received by each municipality must be spent on education, 15% must be spent on
health care, while the remaining is unrestricted.
The rules governing the allocation of FPM transfers across municipalities provide unique fea-
tures for our empirical analysis. In particular, the amount of FPM funds transferred to each munic-
ipality in a given year depends on population size in a discontinuous way. As discussed in detail
below, these discontinuities provide a useful source of exogenous variation in municipal funds
available to local governments, part of which must be spent on municipal education.9
9The allocation mechanism described below does not apply to municipalities that are state cap-
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The FPM allocation mechanism groups municipalities into population intervals. These inter-
vals determine the coefficients employed to share total state resources earmarked for the FPM.
Municipalities in higher population brackets have higher coefficients, and hence receive larger
transfers. Each of the 26 federal states receives a different share of the total resources earmarked
for FPM.10 Thus, in a given year, two municipalities from the same state will receive identical
transfers if they are in the same interval. Specifically, let FPMikt be the total FPM transfers re-
ceived by municipality i in state k in year t. The revenue-sharing rule is:
FPMikt =
FPMktθi
∑i∈kθi
(19)
where FPMikt is the amount of resources allocated to state k in year t, and θi is the FPM coefficient
of municipality i based on its population size.
Due to sample size restrictions, we restrict our attention to municipalities with less than 50,940
inhabitants. These municipalities account for about 90% of Brazilian municipalities and 1/3 of the
population. The provision of public goods and services in these locations is primarily financed
by intergovernmental transfers from the federal and state governments−local taxes represent only
about 6% of fiscal revenue. Table 2 displays the FPM coefficients applied to each population
interval. We focus our attention on the initial seven thresholds: 10,189; 13,585; 16,981; 23,773;
30,564; 37,356; and 44,148. The intervals between the initial three thresholds are equal to 3,396,
whereas the intervals between the subsequent thresholds amount to twice as much (6,792). For
symmetry, we exclude municipalities with less than 6,793 inhabitants.
[Table 2 about here]
The coefficient θi is assigned to a given municipality by Tribunal de Contas Unia˜o (TCU) on
the basis of population estimates for the previous year. These population estimates are calculated
itals, which are therefore excluded from the analysis. See Mendes, Miranda and Cosio (2008) for
a more detailed review of the institutional features governing the allocation of intergovernmental
transfers in Brazil.
10The federal district (Brazilia) is excluded from the analysis because it contains only one mu-
nicipality.
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yearly by Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatı´stica (IBGE), the national statistical institute.
IBGE is independent from the government and employs a top-down approach in producing these
estimates: municipal-level estimates must be consistent with the state-level estimates; the latter
must in turn be consistent with population estimates of the whole country (which draw on birth
and mortality rates, and net immigration between Censuses).
However, IBGE population estimates for a given year do not perfectly predict the FPM transfers
that each municipality effectively receives in the subsequent year. As noted by Brollo, Nannicini,
Perotti and Tabellini (2013), reasons for such discrepancies may include: (i) imperfect adjustments
of the coefficients assigned to municipalities that split during the period of analysis; (ii) other
distortions in the application of the FPM allocation procedure, which is not audited.
3.2 Preschool provision
According to Brazilian law, in the period of analysis preschool services were provided to children
aged between 4 and 6. There are two types of preschool providers:
(i) Public preschool centers which are run either by the municipality or the state.
(ii) Private preschool centers which are run independently.
Public centers are financed by the public budget, predominately at the municipal-level, though
a number of states have some state public preschool centers as well. Legal provisions mandate
that parents seeking to enroll their children in public preschool must do so in a center that is
located near their home. Enrollment in public centers is not subject to tuition fees and these
centers cannot reject children unless demand exceeds capacity. Private preschool providers are
generally for-profit and have full discretion over tuition fees (INEP, 2002). The child care market
remains highly unregulated. Although education authorities set minimum recommended standards
on teacher qualifications and group size, centers were not bound by strict legal constraints on these
variables.
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4 Data
We use data for the period 2000-2006. The key variables of interest are federal transfers to munic-
ipal governments, and indicators on the supply and quality of municipal and private preschool. We
describe each of these variables in detail below.
4.1 FPM transfers
We use data on FPM transfers received by each municipality and the IBGE population estimates
(the key variables of the FPM revenue-sharing mechanism). Data on FPM transfers are made
available online by Tesouro Nacional, while population estimates can be obtained in the IBGE
website. Using these data, we apply the allocation rule described above to construct the “theoretical
transfers” that each municipality should receive in each year. The amount of federal transfers that
each municipality receives should be computed according to the IBGE population estimates sent
to TCU in the previous year. Hence we use yearly population estimates for the period 1999-2005.
[Table 3 about here]
Table 3 reports summary statistics by population interval on actual and theoretical FPM trans-
fers. We see that average actual transfers within intervals are closely aligned with theoretical
transfers. We also see that municipalities in the proximity of the first four thresholds account for
about 87% of the observations. Figure 1 plots actual and theoretical FPM transfers over the period
2000-2006 against the corresponding population estimates. The upper-left (lower-left) figure in
this figure depicts effectively received (theoretical) transfers, while the seven vertical lines mark
the position of the FPM population thresholds. The right panel displays similar associations, but
where FPM transfers (actual or theoretical) are averaged over cells of 100 inhabitants, as well as the
smoothed average of transfers (represented by the solid line) computed independently within each
interval. All figures show clear discontinuities at the FPM thresholds. These are somewhat more
noisy in the case of actual transfers, suggesting that there exist some cases where FPM transfers
16
are imperfectly asigned to municipalities.11
[Figure 1 about here]
4.2 Private and municipal preschool centers
We use administrative data from Censo Escolar on municipal and private preschool centers and
their inputs for the years 2000 to 2006. Censo Escolar is a compulsory yearly census conducted
by the Ministry of Education, in conjunction with the state-level education departments. This data
set gathers information on the universe of public and private preschool centers in Brazil. In each
year, it comprises data on enrollment, group size, and teacher qualifications. In addition, it collects
information on the infrastructure and equipment of each center, such as whether it has adequate
sanitation for preschool, a playground, and a fridge. To ensure that the information is reported
accurately, inspections are conducted every year on a random sample of centers.
[Table 4 about here]
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics on municipal and private preschool centers in different pop-
ulation intervals. We see that, in the set of municipalities considered, municipal supply accounts
for about 86% of enrollment and 88% of the number of centers. We also see that the proportion of
enrollment accounted for by private providers tends to be higher in larger municipalities, reaching
almost 20% of the total in the largest population intervals.
[Table 5 about here]
Table 5 reports summary statistics on the aforementioned quality indicators of municipal and
private providers. Consistently with the theoretical model presented in Section 2, we see that
private centers tend to have systematically higher quality indicators: group sizes are considerably
smaller, the share of teachers with higher education is slightly higher, and they are more likely
11Theoretical transfers exibit some heterogeneity within intervals due to the different share re-
ceived by each state.
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to have a playground, adequate sanitation for preschool, and a fridge. We also see that quality
indicators are fairly homogeneous across municipalities of different size.
4.3 Additional data
To perform validity tests to our empirical strategy, we use additional data from IPEA on a number
of time invariant attributes of municipalities. These include the area of the municipality (in squared
Km), its altitude, latitude, and longitude, as well as the distances to the state and federal union
capitals.
5 Empirical method
Here we present the econometric strategy for examining the impact of FPM transfers on the supply
of municipal and private preschool in Brazilian municipalities. As shown by Brollo, Nannicini,
Perotti and Tabellini (2013) the allocation system of FPM transfers makes it possible to apply a
(fuzzy) Regression Discontinuity (RD) design. A municipality will receive high versus low federal
transfers (the treatment) depending on its population size (the running variable) in a stochastic
manner, but the likelihood of being treated conditional on the running variable is known to have
sizable discontinuities at multiple thresholds.
In the neighborhood of a given population threshold separating two population intervals of the
FPM revenue-sharing mechanism, “theoretical” transfers sharply increase from a lower to a higher
level. Theoretical transfers are therefore a step function of population (the running variable). Due
to imperfect compliance or measurement error, transfers effectively received by municipalities
may differ from theoretical transfers. Theoretical transfers can therefore be thought of as the
treatment assignment and actual transfers as the observed treatment. In the neighborhood of the
population thresholds, treatment assignment is exogenous, though the observed treatment may
also be influenced by additional factors, such as the ability of local governments to sidestep the
exogenous assignment rule. As long as actual transfers depend on theoretical transfers, however,
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we can use the latter as an instrument in a (fuzzy) regression discontinuity setup.
We estimate an equation of the form:
yit = g(Pit−1)+Tit + γs+δt +µit (20)
where yit is the outcome of interest, g(Pi) is a high-order polynomial in the population of the
municipality in the previous year, Tit is the amount of FPM transfers received by municipality i in
year t (instrumented by theoretical transfer), γs are state fixed-effects, δt are year effects, and µit
the error term (clustered at the municipality level).
6 Empirical results
6.1 Validity tests
One potential concern about the validity of the fuzzy RD design we adopt is potential manipulation
of the running variable−for example, if local governments were able to attract more inhabitants
to obtain larger transfers, or manipulate the IBGE population estimates sent to the TCU. As we
noted above, the way in which IBGE population estimates are constructed makes these sources
of potential manipulation unlikely. Even if the official population figures released to obtain the
transfers were subject to manipulation, the use of IBGE estimates (rather than TCU data) as an
instrument would remove this problem.
[Table 6 about here]
We nevertheless inspect for manipulative sorting by performing balance tests (reported in Table
6) on several time-invariant municipal characteristics. In the presence of nonrandom sorting, some
of these characteristics would likely differ systematically between treated and untreated municipal-
ities around each threshold. The attributes we examine are the area of the municipality (measured
in squared Km) and its geographical location (altitude, latitude, longitude, and distances to the
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state and federal capitals). The balance tests are performed by testing for the presence of discon-
tinuities in these attributes at the pooled thresholds. We consider all seven thresholds pooled, and
also examine the four initial ones separately (for which we have a larger number of observations in
the vicinity of each threshold). Reassuringly, we do not observe any significant discontinuity along
time invariant characteristics of municipalities. We can therefore use a fuzzy RD design as a (local)
source of exogenous variation in the neighborhoods of the seven FPM thresholds considered.
6.2 FPM transfers and the provision of preschool services
In this section, we implement (20) to examine the impact of transfers on the provision of munic-
ipal and private preschool services. The first column of Table 7 reports the estimated first-stage
coefficient on the relationship between theoretical transfers and actual FPM transfers. The point
estimate is positive, smaller than one, and estimated with a great degree of precision. The fact that
the coefficient is smaller than one might reflect measurement error, e.g. due to differences between
IBGE population estimates and those used by TCU. In the second column, we see that theoretical
transfers further exhibit a strong positive relationship with total federal transfers (not just FPM
transfers) received by municipal governments. This evidence reassures us that the discontinuities
of FPM transfers at the thresholds of interest are not offset by systematic changes in other federal
transfers−as would be expected in the absence of other relevant policy discontinuities affecting the
allocation of transfers around these thresholds.
[Table 7 about here]
In Table 8 we examine the effects of larger transfers on the quantity of municipal and private
preschool, as measured by enrollment and the number of private centers. Panel A reports the effects
on municipal supply. The first two columns report reduced-form regressions relating theoretical
transfers to municipal enrollment, whereas the last two columns report results from IV specifi-
cations where theoretical transfers serve as instruments for actual transfers. We see that larger
transfers increase significantly the number of and enrollment in municipal preschool centers. On
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average, a one standard deviation increase in the amount of FPM transfers (8.84 hundred thousand
reais) increases municipal enrollment by about 41 pupils (8.5% of average enrollment), and rises
the number of centers by 2.56 (20% of the number of centers, on average). Taken together, these
estimates suggest that the marginal municipal centers constructed with the extra FPM revenues
tend to be smaller than the average center.
[Table 8 about here]
We now turn to the effects of larger transfers on the supply of private preschool (reported in
Panel B). Since private suppliers operate independently, the amount of FPM transfers would not be
expected to affect private supply other than via the observed expansion in public supply. We see
that there is no robust evidence that an expansion of public supply crowds out private supply. If
anything, there is some weak evidence that private enrollment increases: when looking only at the
first four thresholds, we see a positive and weakly significant (at the 10% level) effect on private
enrollment in preschool. If interpreted in the context of the theoretical model presented above,
this evidence suggests that the difference in willingness-to-pay for preschool services between the
demand segments is relatively large.
[Table 9 about here]
The results in Table 9 show the reduced-form and IV effects of larger transfers on quality indi-
cators of municipal and private supply. We see that larger transfers−and the resulting expansion in
public supply−have no significant impacts on the quality of private supply. This evidence is there-
fore consistent with the theoretical assumption we adopt that the quality level of private supply is
fixed. In general, we also see no robust evidence that the expansion in municipal supply leads to
systematic changes in quality indicators.
[Table 10 about here]
For robustness, in Table 10 we examine more directly the relationship between municipal and
private supply, using theoretical transfers as instrument for municipal enrollment (Panel A) and
21
municipal centers (Panel B). Once again, the estimates in this table do not show evidence that an
expansion in public supply crowds out private supply.
7 Concluding remarks
We have examined if and how an expansion in the supply of public preschool affects private pro-
vision. Using rich data for municipalities in Brazil from 2000-2006, we have used an RD design
to exploit the fact that federal transfers received by local governments exhibit a non-linear and
non-monotonic relationship with given population estimates. The results reveal that larger federal
transfers lead to a significant expansion of municipal preschool, as measured by the number of cen-
ters and enrollment, but show no impacts on the quality or quantity of local private providers. These
findings are consistent with a theoretical model in which households differ in willingness-to-pay
for preschool services, and private suppliers optimally adjust prices in response to an expansion of
lower-quality, free-of-charge public supply. In the context of the model, the absence of crowding-
out effects of more municipal preschool providers can be rationalized by the existence of relatively
large differences in willingness-to-pay for preschool services across different demand segments.
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Figure 1: Actual and theoretical FPM transfers 
 
Notes: The upper left panel plots actual FPM transfers versus population size; the upper right scatterplot is averaged over 
100-inhabitant bins plus running-mean smoothing performed separately in each interval between two thresholds. The lower 
left panel plots theoretical FPM transfers versus population size; the lower right scatterplot is averaged over 100-inhabitant 
bins plus running-mean smoothing performed separately in each interval between two thresholds.  
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Table 1: Effect of public supply on private enrollment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: FPM coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n < 1 − c n > 1 − c
vA <

v A − −
vA >

v A + 0
Population FPM coefficient
Below 10,189 0.6
10,189-13,584 0.8
13,585-16,980 1
16,981-23,772 1.2
23,773-30,564 1.4
30,565-37,356 1.6
37,357-44,148 1.8
44,149-50,940 2
Above 50,940 2-4
  
 
Table 3: Actual and theoretical FPM transfers 
 
Notes: Actual and theoretical FPM transfers are in hundred thousand  
Brazilian reais at 2000 prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Population Actual transfers Theoretical transfers Obs.
6,793-10,188 13.91 13.11 5211
10,189-13,584 18.20 17.65 3982
13,585-16,980 22.48 22.28 2931
16,981-23,772 26.77 26.78 3931
23,773-30,564 31.12 31.17 2312
30,565-37,356 35.35 35.60 1412
37,357-44,148 39.55 39.80 907
44,149-50,940 43.81 44.43 542
Total 23.42 23.13 21168
Table 4: Preschool supply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Population Enrollment  centers Obs.
6,793-10,188 240.09 7.14 5211
10,189-13,584 320.84 9.85 3982
13,585-16,980 409.75 12.21 2931
16,981-23,772 519.85 14.85 3931
23,773-30,564 691.08 17.52 2312
30,565-37,356 863.46 21.44 1412
37,357-44,148 1042.58 22.85 907
44,149-50,940 1245.77 25.60 542
      Total 480.05 12.98 21168
6,793-10,188 16.35 0.50 5211
10,189-13,584 32.65 0.87 3982
13,585-16,980 50.71 1.28 2931
16,981-23,772 78.35 1.88 3931
23,773-30,564 135.38 2.88 2312
30,565-37,356 192.72 3.90 1412
37,357-44,148 226.60 4.55 907
44,149-50,940 264.46 5.24 542
      Total 75.54 1.71 21168
Panel A: Municipal supply
Panel B: Private supply
Table 5: Quality indicators of preschool providers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Population Group size
% teachers 
with higher 
education
Playground Adequate 
sanitation Fridge Obs.
6,793-10,188 23.64 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.62 5170
10,189-13,584 24.17 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.59 3936
13,585-16,980 24.34 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.56 2899
16,981-23,772 24.36 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.57 3901
23,773-30,564 25.18 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.57 2301
30,565-37,356 24.74 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.59 1397
37,357-44,148 24.67 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.64 903
44,149-50,940 24.75 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.66 540
      Total 24.28 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.59 20982
6,793-10,188 14.04 0.22 0.62 0.49 0.68 1874
10,189-13,584 14.53 0.23 0.67 0.56 0.71 2153
13,585-16,980 14.65 0.24 0.68 0.57 0.70 1834
16,981-23,772 15.51 0.24 0.69 0.60 0.72 3009
23,773-30,564 16.20 0.25 0.69 0.62 0.75 1970
30,565-37,356 16.33 0.27 0.71 0.64 0.75 1287
37,357-44,148 16.17 0.28 0.76 0.69 0.78 873
44,149-50,940 15.57 0.31 0.77 0.68 0.77 515
      Total 15.26 0.25 0.68 0.59 0.72 13471
Panel A: Municipal supply
Panel B: Private supply
Table 6: Balance tests of invariant municipal attributes 
 
Notes: Estimates from reduced-form regressions relating time-invariant municipal attributes to theoretical transfers. All 
regressions include a three order population polynomial, state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
municipal level in brackets. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Actual and theoretical transfers 
 
Notes: Estimates from reduced-form regressions relating FPM 
transfers and all federal transfers to theoretical transfers. All 
regressions include a three order population polynomial, state and 
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
municipal level in brackets. *, **, *** represent significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Area Elevation Latitude Longitude Distance to federal capital
Distance to 
state capital Obs.
Thresholds 1-7 -47.643 0.737 0.001 0.000 0.334 -0.326
[32.080] [1.460] [0.009] [0.010] [1.006] [0.950]
Thresholds 1-4 -21.432 0.516 -0.001 0.007 1.664 -0.357
[24.250] [1.790] [0.011] [0.013] [1.198] [1.150]
21,124
18,321
FPM transfers All Transfers Obs.
Thresholds 1-7 0.804*** 0.989***
[0.010] [0.040]
Thresholds 1-4 0.753*** 0.853***
[0.012] [0.037]
21,168
18,365
  
 
 
Table 8: FPM transfers and preschool supply 
 
Notes: Reduced form regressions relate the relevant outcome to theoretical transfers. In the IV 
regressions, theoretical transfers serve as instrument for actual transfers. All regressions include a 
three order population polynomial, state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at 
the municipal level in brackets. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enrollment  centers Enrollment  centers
Thresholds 1-7   	


 
  
 
Thresholds 1-4 	
   	
	 	  
Thresholds 1-7    
  	 	
Thresholds 1-4 	   
  	 
21,168
18,365
21,168
18,365
Reduced form IV
Obs.
Panel A: Municipal supply
Panel B: Private supply
  
Table 9: FPM Transfers and the quality of preschool supply 
 
Reduced form regressions relate the relevant outcome to theoretical transfers. In the IV regressions, theoretical transfers serve as instrument for actual transfers. 
All regressions include a three order population polynomial, state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in brackets. *, **, 
*** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group size
% teachers 
with higher 
education
Playground Adequate 
sanitation Fridge Group size
% teachers 
with higher 
education
Playground Adequate 
sanitation Fridge
Thresholds 1-7 0.061 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.075 -0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.001
[0.041] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.051] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Thresholds 1-4 0.108** -0.002* 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.144** -0.003* 0.003 -0.001 0.002
[0.050] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.066] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Thresholds 1-7 0.010 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.012 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.000
[0.036] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.045] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Thresholds 1-4 0.043 -0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.001 0.058 -0.001 -0.005 0.006 0.001
[0.049] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.066] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
20,990
18,207
10,840
13,471
Reduced form IV
Obs.
Panel A: Municipal supply
Panel B: Private supply
Table 10: IV Estimates: Private and public preschool supply 
 
Theoretical transfers serve as instrument for the measure of the size of public 
supply. All regressions include a three order population polynomial, state and 
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in 
brackets. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Private 
enrollment

 Private 
centers
Obs.
Panel A: Municipal enrollment
Thresholds 1-7 0.222 0.000
[0.207] [0.003]
Thresholds 1-4 
 

 
Panel B: Municipal centers
Thresholds 1-7  

 	
Thresholds 1-4  

 

21,168
21,168
18,365
18,365
Most Recent Working Paper 
 
 
NIPE WP 
16/2013 
Bastos, Paulo e Odd Rune Straume, “Preschool education in Brazil: Does public supply crowd 
out private enrollment?”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
15/2013 
Martins, Rodrigo e Francisco José Veiga, “Does voter turnout affect the votes for the incumbent 
government?”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
14/2013 
Aguiar-Conraria, Luís, Pedro C. Magalhães e Christoph A. Vanberg, “Experimental evidence 
that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
13/2013 
Silva, José Ferreira, J. Cadima Ribeiro, “As Assimetrias Regionais em Portugal: análise da 
convergência versus divergência ao nível dos municípios”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
12/2013 
Faria, Ana Paula, Natália Barbosa e Vasco Eiriz, “Firms’ innovation across regions: an 
exploratory study”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
11/2013 
Veiga, Francisco José, “Instituições, Estabilidade Política e Desempenho Económico 
Implicações para Portugal”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
10/2013 
Barbosa, Natália, Ana Paula Faria e Vasco Eiriz, “Industry- and firm-specific factors of 
innovation novelty”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
09/2013 
Castro, Vítor e Megumi Kubota, “Duration dependence and change-points in the likelihood of 
credit booms ending”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
08/2013 
Monteiro, Natália Pimenta  e Geoff Stewart “Scale, Scope and Survival: A Comparison of 
Cooperative and Capitalist Modes of Production”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
07/2013 
Esteves, Rosa-Branca e Joana Resende, “Competitive Targeted Advertising with Price 
Discrimination”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
06/2013 
Barbosa, Natália, Maria Helena Guimarães e Ana Paula Faria, “Single Market non-
compliance: how relevant is the institutional setting?”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
05/2013 
Lommerud, Kjell Erik, Odd Rune Straume e Steinar Vagstad, “Mommy tracks and public 
policy: On self-fulfilling prophecies and gender gaps in promotion”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
04/2013 
Brekke, Kurt R., Luigi Siciliani e Odd Rune Straume, “Hospital Mergers: A Spatial 
Competition Approach”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
03/2013 
Faria, Ana Paula e Natália Barbosa, “Does venture capital really foster innovation?”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
02/2013 
Esteves, Rosa Branca, “Customer Poaching with Retention Strategies”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
01/2013 
Aguiar-Conraria, Luís, Teresa Maria Rodrigues e Maria Joana Soares, “Oil Shocks and the 
Euro as an Optimum Currency Area”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
27/2012 
Ricardo M. Sousa, “The Effects of Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy: The Case of 
Portugal” 2012 
NIPE WP 
26/2012 
Sushanta K. Mallick e Ricardo M. Sousa, “Is Technology Factor-Neutral? Evidence from the US 
Manufacturing Sector” 2012 
NIPE WP 
25/2012 
Jawadi, F. e Ricardo M. Sousa, “Structural Breaks and Nonlinearity in US and UK Public Debt” 
2012 
NIPE WP 
24/2012 
Jawadi, F. e Ricardo M. Sousa, “Consumption and Wealth in the US, the UK and the Euro Area: 
A Nonlinear Investigation” 2012 
NIPE WP 
23/2012 
Jawadi, F. e Ricardo M. Sousa, “ Modelling Money Demand:  Further Evidence from an 
International Comparison” 2012 
NIPE WP 
22/2012 
Jawadi, F. e Ricardo M. Sousa, “ Money Demand in the euro area, the US and the UK: 
Assessing the Role of Nonlinearity” 2012 
NIPE WP 
21/2012 
Agnello, L,  Sushanta K. Mallick e Ricardo M. Sousa, “Financial Reforms and Income 
Inequality” 2012 
NIPE WP 
20/2012 
Agnello, L, Gilles Dufrénot  e Ricardo M. Sousa, “Adjusting the U.S. Fiscal Policy for Asset 
Prices: Evidence from a TVP-MS Framework t” 2012 
NIPE WP 
19/2012 
Agnello, L e Ricardo M. Sousa, “Fiscal Adjustments and Income Inequality: A First 
Assessment” 2012 
NIPE WP 
18/2012 
Agnello, L, Vitor Castro e Ricardo M. Sousa, “Are there change-points in the likelihood of a 
fiscal consolidation ending?” 2012 
